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(Filed:  March 31, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on Donna Baltimore’s appeal from an 
order entered in the District Court on July 16, 2010, granting appellees, Harrisburg 
Parking Authority, Mark Yobbi, Gail Lewis, Nancy Keim, Richard Gibney and Jason 
Brinker, summary judgment on two separate motions in this civil rights action that 
Baltimore brought against them.  See Baltimore v. Harrisburg Parking Auth., Civ. No. 
1:07-01244, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2010).  The Court set forth 
the background of the case in its comprehensive memorandum opinion and thus we do 
not go into detail describing Baltimore’s complaint.  Instead, we merely explain that the 
case arose from Baltimore’s discharge from her employment with the Authority because 
of her alleged theft from it, an allegation that led to the institution of criminal proceedings 
against her on which she was acquitted on July 7, 2005.  After her acquittal, following 
her unsuccessful attempt to be reinstated to her position, she brought this action on July 
9, 2007.   
 On the summary judgment motions the Court found that some of Baltimore’s 
claims were subject to a statute of limitations that required their filing within two years of 
July 7, 2005, the day on which she had been acquitted, and some needed to be filed 
within two years of an even earlier date.  The Court then held that those claims were 
untimely because she did not initiate this action until July 9, 2007.  The Court, however, 
found that her claim that the Authority wrongfully did not rehire her and certain other 
claims that she advanced were not time barred, and it therefore addressed those claims on 
the merits but rejected them.  Ultimately the Court summed up its holding as follows:  
“[t]he majority of [Baltimore’s] claims are time-barred because [Baltimore] filed her 
complaint at least two days after the applicable limitations period expired” and, on “her 
remaining claims based on the Authority’s failure to rehire her, [Baltimore] has failed to 
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produce sufficient evidence to withstand Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.”  
Id. at *29. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367,1 and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Ordinarily, we exercise plenary review on 
an appeal from a summary judgment, see Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 
189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009), and thus we can affirm only if appellees can show “that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Here, however, as we shall explain, appellees do not have 
that burden or, for that matter, any burden at all on this appeal.  
 We start our discussion of the merits of this appeal by pointing out that Baltimore, 
although in her statement of the case indicating that the District Court granted appellees’ 
motion for summary judgment, then seems to have lost track of the procedural posture of 
this case.  In this regard, we observe that the District Court started its opinion by stating 
that “[p]ending before the Court are two separate motions for summary judgment[,]” 
Baltimore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508, at *1, and it ended its opinion by granting 
appellees summary judgment both in its opinion and order.  Accordingly, it should be 
clear to anyone that this case is an appeal from an order issued under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  
Yet in Baltimore’s brief she addresses the standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), a rule concerning motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief 
may be granted.  Then, she starts her discussion of the standard of review by correctly, 
                                          
1 We note that Baltimore’s brief ignores the requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)(A) 
as it does not set forth the basis for the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
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but irrelevantly, explaining that we have “plenary powers to review a final appealable 
order by a United States District Court granting a defense motion pursuant to F. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6).”  Appellant’s br. at 6.   
 Next we quote verbatim from the summary of her argument and Baltimore’s 
argument in her brief: 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 Criminal proceedings against the appellant ended on July 7, 2005.  
Plaintiff filed her complaint on July 9, 2007[,] a Monday, July 7, 2007[,] 




 Heck v. Humprey, 515 U.S.C. [sic] 477 (1994) holds that for 
purposes of malicious prosecution civil rights claims criminal proceedings 
must terminate in a complainants favor before an appropriate claim can be 
brought.  On July 7, 2005 the criminal proceedings against plaintiff 
terminated in her favor.  Plaintiff decided to proceed against defendants and 
met with her attorney on Saturday evening July 7, 2007.  Plaintiff filed her 
complaint on Monday, July 9, 2007.  The court erred in dismissing Donna 
Baltimore’s complaint for untimeliness. 
 
 Wherefore the Court should order Ms. Baltimore’s complaint 
reinstated. 
 
Appellant’s br. at 8-9. 
 Baltimore’s brief is remarkable because she does not address the merits of her case 
in her argument or explain why the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
the merits, even though the District Court granted summary judgment solely on the merits 
of the portion of her case that it held was not time barred.  Furthermore, Baltimore does 
not challenge any aspect of the District Court’s statute of limitations rulings other than 
the Court’s determination that the statute of limitations ran on a Saturday.  Moreover, the 
4 
 
brief ignores the Court’s alternative holdings that certain of Baltimore’s time barred 
claims also failed on the merits.  Baltimore, U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *18 n.4, *19 n.5, and 
*22. n.7.  Indeed, it appears that the Court granted appellees summary judgment on the 
merits of the entire case or on the basis of conclusions with respect to the statute of 
limitations that she does not challenge on this appeal.2   
 Appellees answered Baltimore’s brief by pointing out, inter alia, that Baltimore 
had ignored the merits of the case and, for that reason standing alone, we should affirm 
the District Court’s order for summary judgment.  Though it might be thought that 
appellees’ briefs would have caused Baltimore to take steps to save her appeal, their 
briefs had no such effect.  Quite to the contrary, Baltimore did not file a reply brief nor 
did she seek leave to supplement her opening brief so that she could address the merits of 
the case.  In the circumstances, she has waived a challenge to the order for summary 
judgment and thus we are constrained to reject her appeal.  See United States v. Irizarry, 
341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2003); Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993); Kost 
v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 n.3 (1993).  We also observe that even though Baltimore 
is correct that if the statute of limitations runs on a Saturday an action filed on the 
following Monday is timely, she does not support this contention with any authority, not 
even mentioning the obvious citation to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(3).   
                                          
2 The only claim that the District Court found to be time-barred, but did not also state 
would fail on the merits, was Baltimore’s procedural due process claim.  Because that 
claim related to her contention that the institution of criminal charges against her was an 
attempt to force her from her employment, it clearly accrued before Baltimore was 







                                          
 Overall, we regard the filing of Baltimore’s brief as the equivalent of a failure to 
file a brief and thus we regard her as having abandoned this appeal.3  Consequently, 
though by considering the only issue that Baltimore raises in her argument and the 
District Court’s entire opinion, we would affirm the July 16, 2010 judgment, we, instead 
will dismiss this appeal.  We direct that Baltimore’s attorney provide Baltimore with a 
copy of this opinion and the accompanying judgment within one week of its filing and 
that her attorney file an affidavit with the Clerk of this Court confirming that he has 
complied with this direction. 
3 As is common in opinions, we have written this opinion referring to Baltimore as if she 
wrote the brief herself.  We, of course, know that this is not true as Don Bailey, Esq., has 
represented her on this appeal as he did in the District Court. 
